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This paper examines the link between a firm’s ownership of productive assets and its choice 
of foreign-market entry strategy. We find that, controlling for industry- and country-specific 
characteristics, the most productive firms (i.e., those owning the most assets) will enter 
through greenfield investment, less productive ones will choose M&A, and the least 
productive ones will export. In addition, the most productive firms are shown to prefer whole 
ownership to a joint venture. These predictions are confirmed in an econometric analysis of 
Japanese firm-level data. 
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This paper examines which strategy a ﬁrm will use to enter a foreign market:
exporting, merger and acquisition (M&A), or greenﬁeld investment (through
either a wholly owned subsidiary or a joint venture). We construct a model
linking this choice to observable ﬁrm characteristics, including asset owner-
ship and total factor productivity, as well as to industry- and country-level
determinants, and carry out an econometric analysis using data on Japanese
manufacturing ﬁrms to test the model’s predictions. Our data set is uniquely
suited for this task in that it allows us to distinguish between diﬀerent foreign
direct investment (FDI) and ownership modes and also has enough detail on
parent companies to enable us to study the impact of ﬁrm-speciﬁc variables.
Our analysis is motivated by two empirical observations. First, both FDI
modes—greenﬁeld and M&A—as well as both ownership modes—wholly
owned subsidiary and joint venture—are empirically important. In our data
on Japanese manufacturers, for example, which spans the period 1985 to
2000, greenﬁeld investment into wholly owned subsidiaries accounts for 44.1%
of investment projects, greenﬁeld investment into joint ventures for 38.6% and
M&A for 17.3%.1
These market-entry options are seen by the ﬁrms themselves and by
the public as quite distinct strategies with very diﬀerent implications, for
instance, for market structure and competition (see UNCTAD, 2000, p.
161). Moreover, these decisions are likely to be interdependent. For instance,
whether a ﬁrm will choose FDI over exporting may depend on how prof-
itable it expects greenﬁeld investment or M&A to be. Whether a ﬁrm would
choose M&A and how much it would oﬀer to pay a potential target ﬁrm
will depend on how much it would expect to earn if it instead invested in a
greenﬁeld project or formed a joint venture with a local ﬁrm. This suggests
1Worldwide, cross-border M&As have become increasingly important over time, espe-
cially if one looks not at a count of investment projects but at their value. Global cross-
border M&As in value terms have replaced greenﬁeld investment as the main mode of FDI
over the past decade. In 1999, for instance, the value of cross-border M&As amounted to
80% of total world FDI ﬂows (UNCTAD, 2000, p. xx). World cross-border M&A sales
peaked at $1.14 trillion in 2000 (UNCTAD, 2004, p. 411).
1that one should not examine the determinants of the diﬀerent decisions in
isolation, but rather as part of a more comprehensive decision-making pro-
cess. In particular, one should investigate empirically whether these decisions
are interdependent and, if they are, what the relevant sequential structure of
the decision-making process is.
Second, we observe that the choice of market-entry strategy varies both
across and within industries with respect to underlying characteristics of
the parent company, such as total assets and total factor productivity. In
particular, a look at the mean size (measured by total assets) of the ﬁrms
choosing diﬀerent entry strategies reveals that the largest ﬁrms in our sample
choose greenﬁeld investment; among those the biggest ones choose wholly
owned subsidiaries, whereas ﬁrms of intermediate size choose joint ventures.
Smaller ﬁrms choose M&A, and the smallest ﬁrms export (more on this in
the section on descriptive statistics and in Table 3).
To see whether the apparent relationship between asset ownership and
market entry mode is indeed systematic and statistically signiﬁcant, we have
to control for other potential determinants of the market-entry mode. For
this purpose we construct a model, in which ﬁrm-speciﬁc inﬂuences inter-
act with industry- and country-level inﬂuences to determine the entry-mode
choice. In the model, a ﬁrm ﬁrst chooses between exporting and FDI, and
then—in case of FDI—between greenﬁeld investment and M&A. Finally, if
it has chosen greenﬁeld investment, the ﬁrm has to decide between whole
ownership of its subsidiary or a joint venture with a local ﬁrm. The trade-oﬀ
between exporting and FDI is the classic trade-oﬀ between reducing export-
ing costs (through FDI) and taking advantage of scale economies (through
exporting). Acquiring the assets of a foreign competitor through M&A may
raise productivity, but has the potential disadvantage relative to greenﬁeld
FDI of weakening the merged ﬁrm’s competitive position vis-a-vis its rivals.
If the ﬁrm forms a joint venture, it beneﬁts from the assets contributed by
its joint venture partner but, unlike in the case of whole ownership, cannot
fully capture the beneﬁts of its own assets. We show that these trade-oﬀs
vary with the amount of productive assets that the ﬁrm owns. This allows
us to generate testable predictions regarding the ﬁrm’s market-entry decision
2that we then take to the data.
The contribution of our paper is twofold. First, we oﬀer a more com-
prehensive treatment of ﬁrms’ market-entry options than previous studies,
and we provide empirical evidence that this treatment really matters. For
instance, we ﬁnd that the choice between greenﬁeld FDI and M&A indeed
depends on the proﬁtability of the ownership modes (whole ownership versus
joint venture), and that our sequential model of market-entry decisions pro-
vides a better ﬁt with the data than alternative speciﬁcations. The literature
has typically concentrated on the choice between just two of the market-
entry options. There is, for example, a large literature on the choice between
FDI and exporting, relating this choice to industry and country-level de-
terminants, such as, transport costs, scale economies, market size or factor
endowments (see Markusen (2002) for a survey). There is also a small but
growing literature on cross-border mergers. Theoretical models of horizon-
tal cross-border mergers are provided by Bjorvatn (2004), Horn and Persson
(2001) and Neary (2003), among others. Nocke and Yeaple (2004) build a
theoretical model of international mergers, in which ﬁrms trade assets in an
international merger market. Iranzo (2004) and Tekin-Koru (2004) exam-
ine empirically the choice between greenﬁeld investment and M&A. Another
empirical paper, Bertrand et al. (2003), studies the location of cross-border
M&As. The literature on international joint ventures has tended to focus
on identifying factors determining their success or failure (see Caves, 1996).
Interesting exceptions are Asiedu and Esfahani (2001) and Desai, Foley and
Hines (2002) who investigate the ownership choices of multinational ﬁrms;
these two papers also provide a detailed survey of the joint venture literature.
Second, our paper is related to the rapidly growing literature on ﬁrm
heterogeneity in international trade and investment (see, e.g., Melitz (2003),
Yeaple (2003) and Helpman et al. (2004)). The speciﬁc contribution of our
paper is that we do not only link the FDI-versus-exporting choice to parent
characteristics (as has recently been done, for instance, by Girma et al. (2005)
for ﬁrms in the UK, and by Head and Ries (2003) for Japanese multination-
als), but also the choice between greenﬁeld FDI and M&A, and between
whole ownership and joint venture. In addition, we are able to control for a
3much wider range of parent characteristics than most previous studies.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present the
theoretical framework. In Section 3, we analyze the equilibria of the model
and summarize the testable predictions. Section 4 presents the descriptive
statistics, Section 5 contains the empirical analysis, and Section 6 concludes.
The Appendix provides a proof and a detailed description of the data.
2 The Model
In this section we develop a simple model of horizontal integration, that is,
we consider a ﬁrm that wants to sell the same good abroad that it produces
at home. This allows us to be clear about the interaction of ﬁrm-, industry-
and country-speciﬁc determinants of the ﬁrm’s strategies without having to
consider the additional issue of horizontal versus vertical motives for these
choices. This focus is also justiﬁed by the stylized facts: The World Invest-
ment Report (UNCTAD, 2000, p. 101) ﬁnds that around 70% of cross-border
M&As are of the horizontal and less than 10% of the vertical type, the re-
mainder being classiﬁed as conglomerate. Among the main motives for the
choice of cross-border M&As are gaining market power, taking advantage of
scale economies and acquiring assets (ibid, p. 143). The report (ibid, p. 127)
also ﬁnds that industries characterized by signiﬁcant M&A activity have typ-
ically experienced rising concentration ratios.
These stylized facts suggest that our model should have two key ingredi-
ents, namely imperfect competition and an explicit role for productive assets.
We take this into account by considering the market-entry decisions from the
point of view of a ﬁrm that wants to establish a foothold in a market where it
faces Cournot competition. In this respect the model draws on the industrial
organization literature on horizontal mergers and joint ventures, including
the work of Perry and Porter (1985), Salant, Switzer, and Reynolds (1983),
and Yi (1998). We also assume that ﬁrms own productive assets, e.g., tech-
nology, management skills, specialized intermediate inputs, that determine
their productivity (see, for instance, Farrell and Shapiro, 1990). If a ﬁrm
chooses exporting or establishes a wholly-owned subsidiary, it has to rely on
4its own assets. M&A implies that the ﬁrm acquires the assets of a local target
ﬁrm and combines them with its own assets. If two ﬁrms form a joint ven-
ture they, too, share their assets, but remain independent in other decisions,
speciﬁcally their choice of output.
We denote the home country by h and the host country by f, and assume
that markets in the two countries are segmented. The relevant market for
our analysis is the one in f, and we assume that quasi-linear preferences give
rise to a linear inverse demand function p = a − bQ, with p denoting the
equilibrium price for an aggregate supply of Q. When the home ﬁrm enters
f it faces Cournot competition from a ﬁxed number n−1 of incumbents. We
will label the home ﬁrm as ﬁrm 1 and the local ﬁrms as ﬁrms 2,...,n. Hence
Q =
Pn
i=1 qi, where qi is the output of an individual ﬁrm. The marginal
cost of production of ﬁrm i when it produces in country j = h,f is given
by cij ≡ wj − αi, where wj denotes the country-j wage and αi represents
the ﬁrm’s assets. Hence, the more assets a ﬁrm has the more eﬃcient or
productive it is. If the home ﬁrm serves f through exports from its home-
country plant, an additional unit trade cost of size t arises. We assume that
t < (a − n(wh − α1) +
Pn
i=2(wf − αi))/n so that the proﬁt from exporting
is positive. Building a plant in the foreign country in the case of greenﬁeld
investment involves a sunk cost F.
If the home ﬁrm wants to acquire a local ﬁrm (and its production plant),
it makes a take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer that the latter accepts or rejects. After the
merger, the two ﬁrms combine their assets and the home ﬁrm decides how
much output to produce in the acquired plant. We refer to the acquisition
target as ﬁrm 2 and to the merged ﬁrm as ﬁrm 1.2 How well the assets
of the two ﬁrms complement each other is measured by a parameter γ ≤
1. In particular, we let the marginal cost of the merged ﬁrm be given by
wf −γ(α1 +α2). If γ = 1, the assets of the two ﬁrms complement each other
perfectly; if γ < 1, some of the assets overlap or are otherwise diﬃcult to
2Modelling the search for an acquistion target, sequential oﬀers to diﬀerent targets, or
competition between multinationals for the same target is beyond the scope of the current
paper, but would appear to be worthwhile extensions.
5combine.3
Once the home ﬁrm has paid the sunk cost of F to establish a greenﬁeld
presence, it may operate a wholly owned subsidiary or oﬀer to enter into a
joint venture with a local partner (ﬁrm 2).4 There are many reasons why ﬁrms
may enter into a joint venture. A key beneﬁt is that a joint venture allows
the two ﬁrms to share assets, for instance, by exchanging technology and
marketing know-how, sharing R&D or specialized inputs, while remaining
independent in other respects. We assume speciﬁcally that the joint venture
partners continue to choose output independently. A key problem arising in
joint ventures is how the partners are compensated for the assets they con-
tribute, especially if it is diﬃcult to determine ex ante the value of speciﬁc
assets, such as technology, R&D or specialized inputs, that the partners will
share. The value of the assets contributed by each partner may also be un-
veriﬁable to outside parties ex post and hence non-contractible. We capture
this in a simple way, namely by assuming that there are no (side-) payments
between the joint venture partners ex ante and that both partners bene-
ﬁt equally from the assets contributed. The marginal cost of partner ﬁrm
i = 1,2 in a joint venture hence is wf − γ(α1 + α2), where for simplicity
we have selected the same parameter γ as in the merger case to capture the
degree of complementarity between assets.
The overall decision-making process can be represented by the following
sequential game: in stage one, ﬁrm 1 chooses between exporting and mak-
ing a take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer to acquire ﬁrm 2. In stage two, ﬁrm 2 decides
whether to accept or reject the oﬀer. If it rejects the oﬀer, we come to stage
3, in which ﬁrm 1 chooses whether to invest greenﬁeld. In stage 4, if it has
selected greenﬁeld investment, the ﬁrm may choose between whole owner-
ship or making a joint-venture proposal to ﬁrm 2. In stage 5, ﬁrm 2 has the
option of accepting or rejecting this proposal. In stage 6, all ﬁrms choose
3Note that we could also accomodate the case where γ > 1. Another reasonable exten-
sion would be to assume that after the merger ﬁrm 1 is less eﬃcient at using the assets of
ﬁrm 2 than that ﬁrm on its own. In this case we would have c1f ≡ wf − γ(α1 + βα2) for
β ≤ 1.
4The assumption that F is paid by the home ﬁrm is made for simplicity; not much
would change, if we assumed that this cost was shared by the joint venture partners.
6output noncooperatively. Note that in this setup, ﬁrm 1 can always make an
unacceptably low merger oﬀer to ﬁrm 2, if it prefers greenﬁeld investment or
a joint venture. Hence moving the M&A decision to stage 2 does not reduce
ﬁrm 1’s choices, but allows us to make explicit that greenﬁeld investment,
either through a wholly owned subsidiary or in the form of a joint venture,
is ﬁrm 1’s outside option if ﬁrm 2 refuses the acquisition oﬀer.
3 The Equilibrium Market Entry Strategy
In this section, we characterize the subgame perfect equilibria of the game and
derive predictions about the ﬁrm’s choice of market-entry strategy. Solving
the game backwards, we begin with the choice of ownership mode (whole
ownership versus joint venture) in the case of greenﬁeld investment, and
then move to the investment mode (greenﬁeld vs. M&A), assuming that the
ﬁrm does not want to export. We then turn to the decision of whether to
choose FDI or exporting.
3.1 Whole Ownership versus Joint Venture
Greenﬁeld investment implies that ﬁrm 1 makes an investment in the host
country at a cost of F. All n ﬁrms hence have plants in the host country. If
ﬁrm 1 operates a wholly owned subsidiary, denoted by the superscript W,





A + nαi − αj
(n + 1)b
, (1)




(A + nαi − αj)2
(n + 1)2b
, (2)
where A = a − wf −
Pn
k=3 αk.
In case of a joint venture, denoted by the superscript J, the market struc-
ture does not change as all ﬁrms remain independent. The equilibrium output




A + (n − 1)γ(α1 + α2)
(n + 1)b
, (3)




(A + (n − 1)γ(α1 + α2))2
(n + 1)2b
. (4)
If ﬁrm 1 can obtain a positive proﬁt under both investment options, i.e.,
min{ΠW
1 ,ΠJ
1} ≥ F, then a comparison between (2) and (4) reveals that ﬁrm
i prefers a joint venture with ﬁrm j to remaining independent if
αj ≥
n − (n − 1)γ
1 + (n − 1)γ
αi. (5)
That is, a joint venture is attractive for ﬁrm i, if partner ﬁrm j has suﬃcient
assets relative to its own assets so that the partners are not too asymmetric.
The reason for this is the following: a joint venture allows both partners to
reduce their costs and take market share away from the other ﬁrms; at the
same time, the joint venture partner with fewer assets experiences a larger
drop in its marginal cost and hence gains market share relative to the partner
with more assets. Hence if ﬁrm i has a lot more assets than ﬁrm j, a joint
venture would mean that it would lose more market share to ﬁrm j than it
can gain from the n−2 other ﬁrms, making the joint venture an unattractive
option. Firm 1’s choice is illustrated in Figure 1, where a joint venture is the
preferred option (and acceptable to ﬁrm 2) in region J*, and a wholly owned
subsidiary in region W*. Note from (5) that for region J* to be non-empty
we require that γ > 1/2.
The choice between whole ownership and joint venture also depends on
market structure, since for γ > 1/2 the right-hand side of (5) is decreasing in
n. That is, the smaller is n (and hence the more concentrated is the industry),
the more assets ﬁrm j has to have in order to make the joint venture attractive
for ﬁrm i. Joint ventures are hence less likely relative to whole ownership in
concentrated industries.
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Figure 1: Joint venture vs wholly-owned subsidiary3.2 M&A versus Greenﬁeld Investment
In case of a merger, denoted by the superscript M, the merged ﬁrm competes




A + (n − 1)γ(α1 + α2)
nb
, (6)




(A + (n − 1)γ(α1 + α2))2
n2b
. (7)
The acquisition price of a successful merger depends on the choice ﬁrm 1
would make if ﬁrm 2 turned down its oﬀer. Suppose that ΠJ
1 ≥ ΠW
1 , so that
ﬁrm 1 would propose a joint venture in case ﬁrm 2 rejected the merger oﬀer.
In this scenario, ﬁrm 2 would have to be oﬀered an acquisition price of at
least ΠJ
2, namely the proﬁt ﬁrm 2 would receive by rejecting the oﬀer. If, on
the other hand, ΠJ
1 < ΠW
1 , ﬁrm 2 would have to be paid a price of ΠW
2 .
Under which circumstances would ﬁrm 1 prefer a greenﬁeld investment
to a merger? We start with the case where ΠJ
1 ≥ ΠW
1 . This puts us in area J*
of Figure 1. Firm 1 prefers a joint venture to a merger, if ΠJ




(A + (n − 1)γ(α1 + α2))2
(n + 1)2b
− F ≥
(A + (n − 1)γ(α1 + α2))2
n2b
−




(n2 − 2n − 1)(A + (n − 1)γ(α1 + α2))2
n2(n + 1)2b
− F ≥ 0. (8)
Whether this inequality is satisﬁed depends on ﬁrm-speciﬁc characteris-
tics (assets of the potential partners, degree of complementarity), industry-
speciﬁc factors (sunk investment cost, market structure), and country-speciﬁc
factors (market size, wage costs). A joint venture is attractive to ﬁrm 1 com-
pared with a merger, ceteris paribus, if the potential partners have relatively
large assets, the sunk cost of investment is low, and the assets of the potential
9partners are good complements (large γ). This is due to the so-called merger
paradox: the merged ﬁrm has an incentive to produce less output than the
two merging ﬁrms did prior to the merger, thus losing market share to the
independent rivals and making the merger unproﬁtable in the absence of cost
savings. By contrast, the joint venture partners have no such incentive, as
they continue to choose output independently. The cost advantage oﬀered
by sharing assets thus leads to a larger proﬁt increase for the joint venture.
This advantage of the joint venture becomes more pronounced the more as-
sets the ﬁrms have (or the better the complementarities). If the assets are
suﬃciently large, this will oﬀset the sunk cost of investment associated with
the joint venture. Ceteris paribus, a bigger market (smaller b) and a lower
host country wage (larger A) make a joint venture more attractive relative
to a merger.5
We can illustrate the choice between joint venture and merger in Figure 2.
This Figure reproduces Figure 1, except that in region J* we have added a
curve representing (8). This curve is a straight line with a slope of (−1). In
the region below this curve (now labelled region M1), ﬁrm 1 chooses M&A;
in the region above the line, now labelled J, ﬁrm 1 chooses the joint venture
(formally by making an unacceptably low merger oﬀer to ﬁrm 2 that the
latter rejects).
Next, consider the case where ΠJ
1 < ΠW
1 . This puts us in area W* of
Figure 1. Firm 1 will choose a wholly owned greenﬁeld investment rather
than a merger, if ΠW
1 − F ≥ ΠM
1 − ΠW
2 . This inequality can be rewritten as
as ΠW
1 + ΠW
2 − F ≥ ΠM
1 , or
(A + nα1 − α2)2
(n + 1)2b
+
(A − α1 + nα2)2
(n + 1)2b
− F ≥
(A + (n − 1)γ(α1 + α2))2
n2b
. (9)
Greenﬁeld FDI is hence preferred if the joint proﬁt of ﬁrm 1 and ﬁrm 2 under
greenﬁeld investment exceeds the proﬁt of the merged ﬁrm. In the Appendix
we show that if we start at any point where α1 = α2 and increase α1 by
an amount ∆α1, we have to reduce α2 by more than ∆α1 if ﬁrm 1 is to be
5Note that the eﬀect of market structure is ambiguous because a further rival will not
only increase n but also alter A (see (8)), and thus the size of the entrant’s assets are
crucial. This holds also true for subsequent comparisons of entry modes.
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Figure 2: Joint venture vs M&A vs wholly-owned subsidiaryindiﬀerent between greenﬁeld FDI and M&A.6 That is, the indiﬀerence curve
between greenﬁeld investment and M&A must lie everywhere below a line
with a slope of −1. This implies that for suﬃciently large assets ﬁrm 1 prefers
wholly owned greenﬁeld FDI to M&A. This result is illustrated in Figure 2,
where the region labelled M2 represents the parameter values for which ﬁrm
1 will choose M&A; in region W, it will opt for greenﬁeld investment.
The choice between merger and a wholly owned greenﬁeld investment
is also aﬀected by the other parameters of the model. An increase in host-
country market size (lower b) makes greenﬁeld FDI more attractive as does
a lower F and a smaller γ. The impact of a reduction in the host-country













2 − 2n − 1)A + (n − 1)(α1 + α2)(n




The derivative is positive if A is suﬃciently large and/or γ is small; in this
case, a reduction in the host-country wage makes greenﬁeld investment more
likely relative to M&A.
3.3 FDI versus Exporting
Finally, we consider the home ﬁrm’s choice between investing in the host
country, either through greenﬁeld investment or M&A, and supplying the
host market through exports from its home plant. If ﬁrm 1 exports to the




A + nα1 − α2 − n(wh − wf + t)
(n + 1)b
, (10)




(A + nα1 − α2 − n(wh − wf + t))2
(n + 1)2b
. (11)
6We can see this less formally in (9): if we raise α1 and lower α2 by the same amount, the
right-hand side remains unchanged. The left-hand side increases, since the proﬁt function
is convex in the ﬁrm’s assets; that is, the increase in ﬁrm 1’s greenﬁeld proﬁt is bigger
than the fall in the take-over price (ﬁrm 2’s greenﬁeld proﬁt).





1 − F}. We illustrate this trade-oﬀ
by assuming that the ﬁrm’s preferred investment mode is a wholly owned
greenﬁeld subsidiary. In this case the ﬁrm chooses FDI, if ΠW
1 − F ≥ ΠE
1 , or
(A + nα1 − α2)2
(n + 1)2b
− F ≥
(A + nα1 − α2 − n(wh − wf + t))2
(n + 1)2b
. (12)
This inequality is more likely to hold, if ﬁrm 1 has a large amount of assets
(large α1), the host market is large (small b), the home country wage is high
relative to that in the host country, the transport cost is large, and the sunk
cost of investment is small. Similar predictions are obtained if the ﬁrm’s
preferred investment strategy is M&A or joint venture.
3.4 Testable Predictions
Before turning to the empirical part of the paper it is convenient to summarize
the testable predictions of the model concerning the investment strategy
and the choice between exporting and FDI. Figure 2 helps us summarize
the model’s predictions regarding the choice of investment strategy. For a
given α2 we see that the home ﬁrm’s choice of FDI mode depends on the
amount of assets it has. If it has few assets, it will want to choose M&A.
If it has a lot of assets, it will opt for greenﬁeld FDI. A large host market
and low host wage both favor greenﬁeld FDI (both wholly owned and joint
venture) over M&A. The choice between whole ownership and joint venture
is determined by the ﬁrm’s assets relative to those of the potential partner
and by market concentration. If the ﬁrm has a lot of assets compared to a
potential partner, it will prefer whole ownership. Whole ownership is also
preferred if the industry is concentrated.
The choice between FDI and exporting is determined by the ﬁrm’s assets
(bigger ﬁrms tend to choose FDI) and by industry- and country-speciﬁc fac-
tors. In particular, FDI is selected, if the host market is big, the host wage
is low compared to the one at home, the transportation cost is high and the
sunk investment cost is small.
124 Data and Descriptive Statistics
Our data set consists of Japanese foreign direct investments in 21 developed
countries during the period 1985 to 2000.7 We restrict our sample to invest-
ments in developed countries for two reasons: First, we only consider host
countries that did not impose local ownership requirements, i.e., rules typ-
ically forcing foreign investors into joint ventures with local partners. This
eliminates many developing countries, simply because they impose such re-
quirements. Second, we want to be consistent with our theoretical analysis
which concentrated on horizontal investment—and this type of investment
takes place mostly between developed countries.8
Table 1 details the 759 investments that comprise this study. 285 Japanese
manufacturing multinational enterprises (MNEs) were responsible for 578 in-
vestments into manufacturing aﬃliates, for an average of 2 investments per
parent ﬁrm. Wholly owned subsidiaries accounted for over 44% of all man-
ufacturing aﬃliates, with joint ventures and M&As totaling 39% and 17%,
respectively. Since we do not have destination-speciﬁc export data for our
sample ﬁrms, we cannot directly observe which ﬁrms supplied our sample of
host countries through exporting. However, we are able to determine which
Japanese manufacturers have established wholesale/retail aﬃliates in a par-
ticular country. We let these ﬁrms represent the exporters in our sample,
although we realize that there are exporters that use independent distribu-
tors to sell their products abroad, for instance, by going through a trading
company within the same keiretsu (i.e., business group).9 The sample con-
tains 181 wholesale and retail aﬃliates established by 100 Japanese MNEs,
and none of these ﬁrms have manufacturing aﬃliates in the sample countries.
In regard to investment location, a majority of the manufacturing aﬃl-
iates in our sample were established in the UK (144 investments), France
7See the Appendix for a detailed description of the data and data sources.
8Most of the cross-border M&A activity in the world takes place between developed
countries. Between 1988 and 2003, the ratio of cross-border M&As between developed
countries to world cross-border M&As never dropped below 77%, reaching a peak in 1988
at over 97% (UNCTAD, 2004, p. 411).
9We do, however, control for keiretsu membership.
13Table 1: FDI Data Description
Aﬃliate Type Number of Investments %of Investments
Merger/Acquisitions 100 17.3%∗
Greenﬁeld Investments 255 44.1%∗
Joint Ventures 223 38.6%∗
Wholesale/Retail 181 100%
Parent Information
# w/ Manuf. Invst. 285
Avg. per Parent 2.02
# w/ Whlsle/Retl Invst. 100
Avg. per Parent 1.81
Notes: * - percentage of manufacturing investments
Table 2: Correlation of Firm-Speciﬁc Characteristics
KrtsuMem FirmAge ATFP TFP MarCap Size Sales R&D Export%
KrtsuMem 1.000
FirmAge 0.224 1.000
ATFP 0.377 0.083 1.000
TFP 0.356 0.177 0.826 1.000
MarCap -0.110 -0.085 0.037 0.022 1.000
Size 0.270 0.136 0.542 0.558 -0.005 1.000
Sales 0.255 0.097 0.408 0.571 0.013 0.958 1.000
R&D 0.191 0.021 -0.170 0.015 -0.050 0.207 0.173 1.000
Export% 0.003 -0.083 0.035 0.030 -0.074 0.079 0.100 0.048 1.000(72), Germany (68), and Canada (54). M&A investments were primarily lo-
cated in the UK (30% of M&A investments), France (16%), and Germany
(13%), while greenﬁeld investments (both wholly owned and joint ventures)
are more evenly spread throughout the sample countries. Over one-third of
the wholesale/retail aﬃliates were established in Germany (64 investments),
with a majority of the remaining aﬃliates located in the UK, France, and
the Netherlands.
Our model suggests that ﬁrm-level characteristics—speciﬁcally the
amount of “productive assets” a ﬁrm owns—have an inﬂuence on the choice of
entry strategy. We observe several parent-speciﬁc characteristics that we can
use to proxy for a ﬁrm’s “productive assets”, including the ﬁrm’s total assets
(Size), and total sales (Sales). Other parent-speciﬁc characteristics, such as
market capitalization (MktCap), R&D intensity (R&D), global export per-
centage (Export%), age (FirmAge), and keiretsu membership (KrtsuMem),
appear less suitable for this purpose, but can serve as further controls.
In the model, the ownership of productive assets directly translates into
productivity. This suggests that the ﬁrm’s total factor productivity may be
an even better proxy for asset ownership. We are able to calculate two mea-
sures of a ﬁrm’s TFP: “Approximate Total Factor Productivity” (ATFP)
using the approach of Grilliches and Mairesse (1990), and “Levinsohn-Petrin
TFP” (TFP) following Levinsohn and Petrin (2003).10 Table 3 gives the
mean values for each of these variables across all Japanese parents, with each
variable measured with a one-year lag from the investment date. Table 2 pro-
vides the correlation matrix of the major ﬁrm-speciﬁc characteristics. Note
that Size and Sales are highly correlated (0.958), as are the ATFP and TFP
measures (0.826), while Size and Sales also somewhat correlated with our
TFP measures. Relatively low pair-wise correlation exists between the re-
maining variables.
As indicated at the top of Table 3 for the whole sample of ﬁrms, ﬁrms that
establish wholly-owned subsidiaries tend to be larger (both in Size and Sales)
than those engaging in joint ventures, and these in turn tend to be larger
10Details are provided in the Appendix.
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Joint Whlsale/ ANOVA
All Firms M&A WOS Venture Retail F-stat p-value
FirmAge 52.49 51.35 53.81 45.52 9.104 6.34e-6∗
MarketCapital 2.03e+10 1.75e+10 1.79e+10 2.87e+10 0.551 0.648
Export% 26.39 23.83 17.82 23.01 1.789 0.148
Sizea 402,158 697,752 485,211 122,044 18.192 2.11e-11*
Salesa 352,687 742,073 494,970 101,861 17.514 5.36e-11*
TFP 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.003 8.15 2.45e-5*
R&D 3.83 4.38 4.41 4.12 0.905 0.438
KeiretsuMemberb 0.606 0.655 0.679 0.436 10.068 1.65e-6*
SIC 28
FirmAge 59.79 54.71 54.68 55.80 0.425 0.736
MarketCapital 7.89e+9 6.96e+9 1.42e+10 7.03e+10 2.372 0.074***
Export% 10.17 8.03 12.15 11.20 1.819 0.148
Sizea 500,438 363,568 308,876 126.813 7.611 1.10e-4*
Salesa 395,733 297,521 304,239 98,284 6.023 7.65e-4*
TFP 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.002 1.117 0.096***
R&D% 4.80 5.47 5.30 5.94 0.448 0.719
KeiretsuMemberb 0.684 0.692 0.824 0.800 0.862 0.462
SIC 35
FirmAge 56.89 52.62 51.24 43.60 5.366 0.002*
Market Capital 1.31e+10 9.19e+8 6.70e+9 1.51e+10 2.786 0.043**
Export% 18.94 27.76 21.69 25.14 1.515 0.213
Sizea 414,426 732,571 536,858 74,501 8.915 1.79e-5*
Salesa 340,882 765,330 535,699 57,908 7.843 6.75e-5*
TFP 0.003 0.004 0.004 0.003 2.188 0.073***
R&D% 3.37 4.51 4.55 3.03 3.859 0.011**
KeiretsuMemberb 0.556 0.694 0.724 0.310 7.875 6.49e-5*
SIC 36
FirmAge 47.08 46.78 54.45 41.40 4.845 0.003*
Market Capital 1.72e+10 3.57e+9 6.80e+9 5.43e+10 2.944 0.036**
Export% 24.42 35.49 24.45 28.49 2.596 0.055***
Sizea 269,801 669,471 612,553 73,536 3.623 0.015**
Salesa 220,013 662,941 618,850 59,044 3.396 0.020**
TFP 0.003 0.007 0.003 0.002 4.193 0.007*
R&D% 4.87 4.51 4.23 4.87 0.367 0.777
KeiretsuMemberb 0.750 0.706 0.546 0.171 10.856 2.13e-6*
Notes: a - Millions of Yen, b - Measured as a dummy variable (1= keiretsu
member, 0 otherwise); *,**,*** - signiﬁcant at the 1%-, 5%-, and 10%-level.than ﬁrms that opt for M&A; the latter are bigger on average than ﬁrms that
only export. The pattern looks somewhat diﬀerent for the other ﬁrm-speciﬁc
characteristics. For instance, ﬁrms establishing aﬃliates via M&A have the
highest export ratio at the time of investment and tend to be older than ﬁrms
establishing wholly-owned subsidiaries.
To determine whether the means of parent-speciﬁc characteristics diﬀer
signiﬁcantly across ﬁrms choosing diﬀerent investment modes, we perform
an ANOVA analysis. Speciﬁcally we test the hypothesis that the mean val-
ues for each ﬁrm-speciﬁc characteristic are equivalent across each investment
type. ANOVA is employed to avoid the increased likelihood of Type-I error
associated with the use of multiple pairwise t-tests, although a drawback to
ANOVA is that it cannot indicate which of the mean value(s) signiﬁcantly
diﬀer(s) from the others. The top section of Table 3 reveals signiﬁcant het-
erogeneity among the parent ﬁrms in regard to ﬁve characteristics (FirmAge,
Size, Sales, TFP, KrtsuMem). However, since this heterogeneity may arise
simply from the inclusion of the ﬁrms that only export, we re-ran the ANOVA
tests only for parents with manufacturing aﬃliates. Here we ﬁnd signiﬁcant
diﬀerences among the means in regard to Size and Sales, suggesting that the
heterogeneity arising from ﬁrm age and keiretsu membership did result from
the inclusion of the exporters.
To see whether the diﬀerences in investment patterns across ﬁrms are
perhaps due only to inter-industry variation, we examined the three largest
investing industries separately, namely chemicals and related products (based
on U.S. SIC 28), industrial equipment and machinery (SIC 35), and elec-
tronic and electric equipment (SIC 36); see Table 3. The results from the
ANOVA analysis suggest that signiﬁcant heterogeneity exists within indus-
tries. For the chemical industry, the choice of entry strategy appears to be
signiﬁcantly diﬀerent depending on the ﬁrms’ market capitalization and total
assets. In both the industrial machinery and electronics industries, we ﬁnd
signiﬁcant heterogeneity across nearly all ﬁrm-level characteristics, includ-
ing TFP. To eliminate the inﬂuence of the export-only parents in the latter
two industries, we again carried out an ANOVA analysis for only the manu-
facturing parents. The results conﬁrm that there exists signiﬁcant ﬁrm-level
15heterogeneity in the investment-mode choice of manufacturers.
Our model suggests that we should also control for country-speciﬁc deter-
minants, speciﬁcally market size. Therefore, we include as regressors several
proxies for the host’s market size, namely GDP and a Harris (1954)-type
economic potential (EconPotential) measure. We also wish to control for
country characteristics that inﬂuence the ﬁrm’s choice, but do not explicitly
appear in the model, including corporate taxes, the supply of potential M&A-
target ﬁrms (or JV partners), and exchange-rate eﬀects that could aﬀect the
price of assets denominated in the local currency. The respective proxies are
the average corporate tax rates (TaxRates), the host’s market capitalization
(HostCap), measured as the sum over all domestically incorporated compa-
nies of the share price times shares outstanding, and the Yen-local-currency
exchange rate (ExchRate). Finally, to control for a ﬁrm’s previous invest-
ment experience, we create variables indicating a ﬁrm’s previous manufac-
turing investment into each host (PrevFDIHost) as well as its manufacturing
investment history over the whole sample of countries (PrevFDISmpl). We
must also account for those investment inﬂuences that do not have speciﬁc
controls, for instance, the degree of market concentration and wage rates.
Thus, we create dummy variables for each host, each aﬃliate industry, and
for each year of the sample.
5 Empirical Framework and Results
Our theoretical framework suggests that a ﬁrm faces a sequential decision
problem, where it ﬁrst has to decide between FDI and exporting. If it opts for
FDI, it has to choose between M&A and greenﬁeld investment. If it decides to
enter via greenﬁeld investment, it faces the choice between a wholly owned
subsidiary and a joint venture. The ﬁrm’s choice at each stage obviously
depends upon the proﬁt associated with each alternative. We can write the
proﬁt for ﬁrm i (i = 1,....I) of choosing a particular market-entry strategy
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j serves as the random component. Explanatory variables can vary over
ﬁrm (i), host country (k), and the aﬃliate’s industry aﬃliation (r). While
this proﬁt is generally unobservable, we do observe the ﬁrm’s actual choice
at each stage. That is, we can work with an indicator variable yi
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In a sequential decision structure the probability of ﬁrm i choosing a
particular market-entry mode j will be determined as the product of the
conditional probabilities at each decision stage. We denote the probability of
a ﬁrm choosing strategy f = 1,2 at stage 1 by Pf, where f = 1 denotes FDI,
and f = 2 denotes exporting. The conditional probability of choosing strategy
m = 1,2 at stage 2 given that the ﬁrm has chosen FDI is P1m, where m = 1
indicates greenﬁeld investment, and m = 2 indicates M&A. Finally, at stage
3 the probability of selecting ownership mode l = 1,2 conditional on the ﬁrm
having chosen greenﬁeld FDI is P11l, where l = 1 stands for whole ownership
and l = 2 for joint venture. Therefore, for example, the probability of entry




Our model is estimated sequentially via standard binomial logit estima-
tion, providing consistent (although not eﬃcient) parameter estimates.11 We
ﬁrst estimate P11l by obtaining coeﬃcients on the parameters inﬂuencing the
choice of ownership mode, assuming that the ﬁrm has chosen both to in-
vest at stage 1 and establish a greenﬁeld investment at stage 2. Empirical
11We ruled out a conditional logit model (McFadden (1974)), since the error structure
in this model assumes the independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA). In the context
of our model this would mean that the choice of market-entry strategy would have to be
independent of changes to the set of possible choices. This is clearly not the case.
A nested logit estimation would have avoided violating the IIA assumption, since IIA
would only have to hold at each stage but not across stages (see McFadden (1983) and
Maddala (1983)). However, we cannot estimate a true nested logit model, since we cannot
employ separate explanatory variables at each stage.
17estimation employs the ﬁrm-, industry-, and country-speciﬁc characteristics
that aﬀect the ﬁrm’s proﬁt function as outlined in (13). Next, we estimate
the probability of ﬁrm i choosing to invest via M&A or greenﬁeld invest-
ment (P i
1m) at stage 2. The decision to invest via greenﬁeld FDI rather than
M&A is based on the relative proﬁtability of each strategy, given the choice
of ownership mode determined at stage 3. We incorporate this stage-3 choice
in our empirical estimation through the inclusive-value term INCi
11, which
represents the expected proﬁt from choosing an ownership mode at stage 3.
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where the coeﬃcients b β, b φ, b ϕ and b λ are obtained from the stage-3 regression.
The coeﬃcient on the inclusive value is of particular interest in determin-
ing if the model is properly speciﬁed. If it takes a value of 0, the ownership
modes (whole ownership vs. joint venture) are perfect substitutes and hence
do not inﬂuence the choice of investment mode (greenﬁeld or M&A). If the
coeﬃcient is estimated to be 1, stages 2 and 3 of the model collapse into
a single-stage multinomial logit model (no tree structure necessary). Thus,
the sequential structure is appropriate when the inclusive-value coeﬃcient is
signiﬁcantly greater than 0, but signiﬁcantly less than 1.
We then turn our attention to the ﬁrst stage, where we estimate the
probability of ﬁrm i choosing FDI versus exporting (P i
f). To account for
the fact that the proﬁtability of FDI depends on the second-stage choice
between greenﬁeld investment and M&A, we include in our regression the
inclusive value term INCi
1, whose value is derived from estimation of the
second stage equation. The interpretation of the coeﬃcient on the inclusive
value is equivalent to the one presented for the stage-2 estimation.
5.1 Stage 3: Wholly Owned Subsidiary versus Joint
Venture
We ﬁrst turn our attention to stage 3 of the ﬁrm’s investment tree—the
choice between a wholly owned subsidiary (WOS) and a joint venture (JV).
18Thus, we pare the sample down to only those manufacturing aﬃliates that
were established via greenﬁeld investment. Table 4 provides the estimation
results, where positive coeﬃcients indicate an increased likelihood of WOS,
while negative coeﬃcients suggest an increased likelihood of JV. To save
space, we do not report the coeﬃcients on the industry, host-country, or
time-speciﬁc dummy variables.
Columns (1) and (2) are the base speciﬁcation, with column (1) using
GDP as a measure of host market size, while column (2) employs a Harris-
type (1954) economic potential (EconPotential) indicator of market size. The
estimation results reveal that, as suggested by theory, greater TFP increases
the probability that a ﬁrm will choose WOS rather than JV. In addition,
the greater a ﬁrm’s export orientation (Export%) and the smaller the pool
of possible JV partners (HostCap), the greater is the likelihood of entry via
WOS.
In column (3) we proxy ﬁrm assets through total assets (Size) rather than
TFP. Here larger ﬁrms are more likely to enter via WOS, while none of the
other variables changes its sign or signiﬁcance.12 Column (4) incorporates
both TFP and Size as measures of a ﬁrm’s assets. In this case, Size remains
a signiﬁcant positive determinant of WOS, while the TFP measure becomes
insigniﬁcant. The inclusion of both measures does not aﬀect the previously
determined inﬂuences of Export% or HostCap, although now a ﬁrm’s previous
investment into that host (PrevFDIHost) makes JV more likely.
Finally, columns (5) and (6) use the alternative measure of a ﬁrm’s TFP,
ATFP. In column (5), when ATFP is the only measure of a ﬁrm’s assets,
its coeﬃcient indicates a positive and signiﬁcant eﬀect on the probability of
selecting WOS. When ATFP is combined with Size, as in column (6), the
eﬀect of ATFP is dominated by Size’s positive and signiﬁcant eﬀect on WOS.
The other ﬁrm-speciﬁc variables, such as a ﬁrm’s keiretsu membership
(KrtsuMem), age (FirmAge), market capitalization (MktCap), R&D spend-
12We also analyze a ﬁrm’s Sales as a measure of its ﬁrm-speciﬁc assets. Given the high
pairwise correlation between Size and Sales, the results are nearly identical; thus, we leave
these unreported. Similar results, also not reported, occur when we replace Size with Sales
in the ﬁrst stage regressions discussed below.
19Table 4: Third-Stage Investment Decision: WOS versus JV
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
KrtsuMem -0.060 -0.062 -0.100 -0.103 -0.017 -0.094
(0.259) (0.259) (0.255) (0.260) (0.262) (0.266)
FirmAge -0.005 -0.005 -0.008 -0.007 -0.004 -0.006
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
MktCap -1.40e-4 -1.26e-4 -3.87e-4 -2.17e-4 5.13e-5 -1.18e-4
(1.49e-3) (1.48e-3) (1.50e-3) (1.53e-3) (1.47e-3) (1.53e-3)
TFP 0.335c 0.301c . -0.040 . .
(0.204) (0.203) (0.224)
ATFP . . . . 0.261c 0.242
(0.167) (0.275)
Size . . 0.286c 0.274c 0.272c
(0.165) (0.171) (0.173)
R&D -2.147 -2.028 -4.183 -2.976 -2.060 -3.070
(3.963) (3.955) (3.383) (4.011) (4.155) (4.209)
Export% 0.023a 0.023a 0.022a 0.022a 0.023a 0.021a
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
PrevFDISample 0.060 .060 0.028 0.037 0.069 0.038
(0.055) (0.058) (0.056) (0.057) (0.057) (0.061)
PrevFDIHost -0.285 -0.286 -0.279 -0.037c -0.288 -0.323c
(0.189) (0.189) (0.189) (0.057) (0.193) (0.196)
GDP -2.42e-4 . . . . .
(7.44e-4)
EconPotential . -0.006 -0.003 -0.004 -0.125 -0.108
(0.156) (0.155) (0.157) (0.163) (0.164)
ExchRate 0.003 0.004 0.003 0.002 0.006 0.005
(0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
HostCap -1.53e-3b -1.48e-3c -1.72e-3b -1.50e-3b -1.51e-3c -1.53e-3c
(7.38e-4) (7.69e-4) (7.50e-4) (7.69e-4) (7.93e-4) (7.92e-4)
Tax Rates 4.972 5.048 5.230 5.524 4.586 5.111
(3.557) (3.465) (3.451) (3.481) (3.638) (3.657)
Obs. 478 478 478 478 478 478
LR test 74.6 74.6 76.2 76.8 75.1 72.5
Prob > χ2 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.002
Pseudo R2 0.182 0.182 0.192 0.191 0.180 0.185
Notes: Logit Model (WOS=1, JV=0). Standard errors in parenthesis. Time,
country, and industry dummy variables included.a,b,c-signiﬁcant at the 5%
and 10%-levels, respectively.ing (R&D), and the sum of previous total investments into the sample coun-
tries (PrevFDISample), do not signiﬁcantly aﬀect the choice of ownership
mode. For the host- country variables, only the aforementioned HostCap is
signiﬁcant; the host’s GDP, EconPotential, exchange rate with respect to the
Yen (ExchRate), and tax rates (TaxRates) have no signiﬁcant inﬂuence.
Summarizing the above results, we ﬁnd that, as suggested by our theory,
greater ﬁrm-speciﬁc assets (TFP, ATFP, Size) lead to increased likelihood
of WOS as compared to JV. In addition, a greater number of potential JV
partners increases the likelihood of JV. Like in our model, market size has
no eﬀect on the choice of ownership mode.
5.2 Stage 2: Greenﬁeld Investment versus M&A
We now turn our attention to the second stage, the choice between green-
ﬁeld investment (WOS or JV) and M&A. The regression results are provided
in Table 5. A positive coeﬃcient estimate indicates a greater likelihood of
entry via M&A, while a negative coeﬃcient estimate indicates an increased
likelihood of entry via greenﬁeld investment. To incorporate how the proﬁts
earned from greenﬁeld investment in stage 3 aﬀect the choice between green-
ﬁeld investment and M&A, we include in our estimation the inclusive values
(INCi
11) determined in the third-stage regressions.
Columns in Table 5 are in the same format as in Table 4 above. In our base
speciﬁcations (columns 1 and 2), increases in a ﬁrm’s TFP value decrease
the likelihood of entry via M&A as compared to greenﬁeld investment. In ad-
dition, increased R&D expenditures and previous manufacturing investment
in that host (PrevFDIHost) lead to a greater likelihood of investment via
greenﬁeld investment, whereas a higher sum of total manufacturing invest-
ment into the sample countries (PrevFDISample) leads to a greater likelihood
of future M&A investment. In regard to the country-speciﬁc characteristics,
the negative and signiﬁcant coeﬃcient on ExchRate indicates that a depre-
ciation of the Yen reduces M&A activity as this raises the cost of merging
with/acquiring a local company.
Replacing TFP with Size in the regression (column 3) does not change
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ment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
KrtsuMem -0.310 -0.315 -0.166 -0.237 -0.284 -0.164
(0.310) (0.310) (0.309) (0.317) (0.310) (0.326)
FirmAge -0.001 -0.001 0.003 0.002 0.001 0.004
(0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
MktCap -4.98e-4 -4.96e-4 -1.44e-4 -1.90e-4 -5.13e-4 -3.05e-4
(1.50e-3) (1.50e-3) (1.62e-3) (1.58e-3) (1.55e-3) (1.65e-3)
TFP -0.233c -0.234c . 0.255 . .
(0.131) (0.133) (0.268)
ATFP . . . . -5.13e-4 -0.127
(1.55e-3) (0.338)
Size . -0.537b -0.659b . -0.519c
(0.280) (0.336) (0.309)
R&D -8.536c -8.208c -8.671c -8.527c -12.410b -9.090c
(5.302) (5.284) (5.317) (5.290) (5.740) (5.523)
Export% 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.005
(0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006)
PrevFDISample 0.228a 0.224c 0.248a 0.251a 0.250a 0.261a
(0.061) (0.061) (0.060) (0.060) (0.067) (0.064)
PrevFDIHost -0.424c -0.419c -0.432c -0.425c -0.453c -0.452c
(0.253) (0.252) (0.260) (0.266) (0.265) (0.284)
GDP 2.32e-4 . . . . .
(9.00e-4)
EconPotential . 0.151 0.127 0.138 0.183 0.185
(0.188) (0.188) (0.188) (0.201) (0.202)
ExchRate -0.017c -0.019b -0.017c -0.018c -0.022b -0.021b
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010)
HostCap -1.21e-3 -1.34e-3 -1.10e-3 -1.24e-3 -1.07e-3 -8.61e-4
(9.47e-4) (9.58e-4) (1.03e-3) (9.89e-4) (9.72e-4) (1.02e-3)
Tax Rates -3.647 -3.540 -4.718 -4.493 -2.940 -3.897
(4.601) (4.410) (4.521) (4.568) (4.432) (4.623)
Inclusive Values 0.385c 0.382c 0.611c 0.651c 0.593c 0.559c
(0.257) (0.252) (0.357) (0.365) (0.366) (0.359)
Obs. 578 578 578 578 578 578
LR test 62.1 62.1 69.5 69.7 68.0 69.0
Prob > χ2 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.01
Pseudo R2 0.187 0.186 0.248 0.249 0.200 .201
Notes: Logit Model (MA=1, Greenﬁeld=0). Standard errors in parenthesis.
Time, country, and industry dummy variables included. a,b,c-signiﬁcant at
the 5% and 10%-levels, respectively.the estimation results, as larger ﬁrms are more likely to invest via greenﬁeld
investment than through M&A. In the regression with both Size and TFP
(column 4), we ﬁnd—similar to the third-stage regression—that the eﬀect of
Size dominates the TFP eﬀect. If we use ATFP as the measure of ﬁrm speciﬁc
assets (column 5), we ﬁnd that although ATFP has the correct sign, its eﬀect
is insigniﬁcant. When both ATFP and Size are included (column 6), Size
retains its signiﬁcant inﬂuence on the likelihood of greenﬁeld investment, as
does the rest of the previously-determined signiﬁcant investment inﬂuences.
Finally, in regard to the inclusive values, we note that in each regression,
the inclusive values are signiﬁcant and signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from both 0
and 1, suggesting that the sequential investment structure is appropriate for
stages two and three of the decision tree.
5.3 Stage 1: FDI versus Exporting
Finally, we turn to the ﬁrm’s ﬁrst-stage decision, FDI versus exporting. Here,
the dependent variable is assigned the value 1 in the case of FDI, and 0 in
case of exporting; therefore, positive coeﬃcient values indicate an increased
likelihood of FDI. Results from this set of regressions are provided in Table 6,
and follow the same structure as the previous two tables. However, as we
include ﬁrms in this stage that are only exporters, we drop the variables
that account for previous manufacturing FDI experience (PrevFDISample,
PrevFDIHost).
We ﬁnd that both measures of ﬁrm productivity (TFP, ATFP) have a
positive and signiﬁcant inﬂuence on the likelihood of FDI. The same is true
if we substitute Size for TFP. Similar to the earlier stages, we observe that
Size remains a signiﬁcant determinant even when added to models with TFP
or ATFP. Keiretsu membership and ﬁrm age are shown to be consistently
positive inﬂuences on the likelihood of FDI across all model speciﬁcations.
Finally, in regard to the inclusive values, we note that the coeﬃcients on
these values are insigniﬁcant (not statistically signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from 0).
Thus, while expected proﬁts from the alternative ownership mode choices
(WOS vs. JV) do aﬀect the greenﬁeld versus M&A decision, the investment
21Table 6: First-Stage Investment Decision: FDI versus Export
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
KrtsuMem 0.809a 0.822a 0.577b 0.578b 0.833a 0.565b
(0.254) (0.253) (0.245) (0.248) (0.250) (0.250)
FirmAge 0.019b 0.019b 0.013c 0.014c 0.022a 0.014c
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009)
MktCap -3.59e-3 -3.61e-3 -3.65e-3c -3.53e-3c -1.81e-3 -1.62e-3
(1.43e-3) (1.41e-3) (1.47e-3) (1.45e-3) (1.75e-3) (1.83e-3)
TFP 0.883a 0.924a . -0.076 . .
(0.212) (0.211) (0.237)
ATFP . . . . 0.689b 0.061
(0.306) (0.305)
Size . . 0.448a 0.428a . 0.451a
(0.083) (0.092) (0.088)
R&D 3.436 4.304 -0.829 -2.565 1.754 -1.465
(5.368) (5.213) (4.699) (4.587) (5.885) (5.671)
Export% -0.001 -0.001 -0.003 -0.002 0.001 -0.002
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004)
PrevFDISample -0.185c -0.192c -0.337b -0.273b -0.081 -0.302b
(0.101) (0.099) (0.131) (0.124) (0.101) (0.138)
PrevFDIHost 0.502b 0.538b 0.430c 0.360 0.368 0.339
(0.251) (0.248) (0.261) (0.258) (0.249) (0.274)
GDP -1.61e-3c . . . . .
(9.16e-4)
EconPotential . -0.090 -0.071 -0.024 -0.152 -0.163
(0.174) (0.176) (0.177) (0.183) (0.196)
ExchRate 0.004 0.006 0.013 0.004 -0.001 0.007
(0.012) (0.122) (0.124) (0.012) (0.012) (0.013)
HostCap -5.66e-4 -3.53e-4 3.08e-4 -9.83e-6 -1.19e-3 -3.13e-4
(1.00e-3) (9.99e-4) (1.07e-3) (1.08e-3) (9.65e-4) (1.08e-3)
Tax Rates 2.286 2.879 3.126 2.522 0.818 1.852
(3.885) (3.810) (3.986) (3.969) (3.658) (3.878)
Inclusive Values 0.383 0.545 0.533 0.599 0.557 0.604
(0.230) (0.306) (0.313) (0.332) (0.302) (0.318)
Obs. 759 759 759 759 759 759
LR test 139.9 137.5 177.9 176.5 140.9 177.0
Prob > χ2 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Pseudo R2 0.303 0.299 0.357 0.356 0.311 0.356
Notes: Logit Model (FDI=1, Export=0). Standard errors in parenthesis.
Time, country, and industry dummy variables included. a,b,c-signiﬁcant at
1%, 5% and 10%-levels, respectively.mode choice (greenﬁeld vs. M&A) is not a signiﬁcant factor in determin-
ing whether the ﬁrm chooses to service the foreign markets through FDI or
exporting.
5.4 Robustness Check
A problem with sequential models, as noted by Greene (2000), is the ad hoc
partitioning of the choice set which may lead to results which might depend
on the deﬁned branches. Thus, even though we note signiﬁcant inclusive
values at the greenﬁeld versus M&A decision stage, we wish to investigate
whether or not our three-stage sequential model is robust to changes in the
ﬁrm’s decision sequence. For instance, it may well be the case that a ﬁrm
does not view the investment decision as a three-stage sequence, as assumed
in our model, but rather as a two-stage process, in which the ﬁrst stage (FDI
or exporting) remains the same, but the second and third stage are merged
into a single stage. In this new second stage, the ﬁrm would then choose
between entry via M&A, WOS, or JV.
We estimate the second stage of this new model via a multinomial logit
model. We then turn to the ﬁrst stage to estimate the probability of ﬁrm i
choosing FDI rather than exporting. The results of the second-stage estima-
tion are reported in columns 1 to 3 of Table 7; those for the ﬁrst stage in
columns 4 to 6.
In stage 2 (columns 1-3), WOS serves as the base category for compar-
isons; a positive (negative) coeﬃcient estimate in the M&A or JV columns in-
dicates a higher (lower) likelihood of that particular entry mode as compared
to WOS. To save space, we do not report the coeﬃcients on the industry,













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































5Notes: Base case in multinomial logit regressions is WOS investment. Stan-
dard errors in parenthesis. Time, country, and industry dummy variables
included. a,b,c-signiﬁcant at 1%, 5% and 10%-levels, respectively.
Each measure of a ﬁrm’s assets (TFP, ATFP, Size) positively aﬀects
the likelihood of WOS relative to M&A. However, only ﬁrm Size positively
increases the likelihood of WOS as compared to JV. This is a slight diﬀerence
between the three-stage and two-stage models, as in the three-stage model,
all three proxies for ﬁrm asset had a positive and signiﬁcant eﬀect on the
WOS likelihood (albeit at the 10% signiﬁcance level). Similar to the three-
stage model, greater R&D investment leads to lower M&A likelihood, while
increased export sales lead to a reduced likelihood of JV investment. Finally,
we note similar eﬀects of the ExchRate and HostCap variables on investment
choices as well. The only notable diﬀerence between the two-and three-stage
framework up to this point is the signiﬁcance of the host’s TaxRates on
ownership choice. Here, a higher host country average corporate tax rate
leads to greater likelihood of entry via WOS (as compared to both M&A and
JV).13
Turning to the FDI versus exporting decision (columns 4-6), we note
similar estimation results as compared to those determined in the three-stage
model (Table 6). All three asset measures (TFP, ATFP, Size) have a positive
and signiﬁcant inﬂuence on the likelihood of FDI. The same continues to hold
for Keiretsu membership (KrtsuMem) and ﬁrm age (FirmAge). The inclusive
values derived from the ﬁrst stage are insigniﬁcant, as they were in the similar
stage of the three-stage framework, suggesting that the investment/ownership
choice is not a signiﬁcant consideration in the FDI versus export decision.
As we have two competing models that both yield similar results (the
larger the ﬁrm’s assets, the greater the likelihood of WOS investment over
the other possible market entry modes), we would like to investigate which
model does a better job at explaining the data. While there is no well-deﬁned
testing procedure for discriminating among tree structures (Greene (2000)),
13The positive inﬂuence of taxes on the likelihood of WOS (as compared to JV) is
consistent with ﬁndings by Desai et al. (2002). They argue that WOS gives ﬁrms greater
freedom than JV to set internal transfer prices to ease their tax burden.
23we can nevertheless assess the relative goodness of ﬁt of the two models via
both the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) and the Bayesian Information
Criterion (BIC). To do so, we compare similar ﬁrst-stage regressions in both
the 3-stage and 2-stage models (e.g., Column 2 in Table 6 with Column 4 in
Table 7). Note that the only diﬀerence between each regression pair is the
inclusive values derived from the estimations of the subsequent stage(s). In
each and every case, both the AIC and BIC criteria yield lower values for the
3-stage models than the 2-stage models, suggesting that the 3-stage model
is the preferred estimation model. Thus, while both the three-stage and two-
stage frameworks produce similar estimation results, given its close relation
to our theoretical set-up and the AIC/BIC criteria tests, we believe that the
three-stage model is the better model in which to examine the market-entry
decision.14
6 Conclusions
The paper examined how a manufacturer supplies goods to a foreign market.
We represented this decision as a three-stage process. In the ﬁrst stage, the
manufacturer decides whether to export or to invest in the foreign country.
In the second stage, the manufacturer chooses the investment mode: green-
ﬁeld investment or M&A. If he opts for greenﬁeld investment, the third-stage
decision is whether to establish a wholly owned subsidiary or to form a joint
venture with a local partner. We constructed a theoretical model to show how
these choices are interrelated and how they are determined by ﬁrm-, industry-
and country-speciﬁc variables. We then confronted the model with ﬁrm-level
Japanese data and found that its main predictions were conﬁrmed. In partic-
ular, we found that, controlling for industry- and country-speciﬁc factors, the
more assets a ﬁrm has (or the higher its total factor productivity) the more
likely it is to choose whole ownership rather than a joint venture, greenﬁeld
14We also analyze a single-staged multinomial logit model with four possible alternatives
(M&A, WOS, JV, Exporting). Hausman tests indicate the IIA assumption fails in this set-
up (test results are omitted for space considerations, but available from the authors). In
addition, this model does not ﬁt our theoretical framework as there is no outside alternative
in case a ﬁrm’s M&A oﬀer is rejected.
24investment rather than M&A, and FDI rather than exporting. These results
indicate that ﬁrm-speciﬁc characteristics play an important role in deter-
mining the pattern of FDI and that we hence should observe considerable
heterogeneity in the investment and ownership mode choices of ﬁrms even
within the same industry. This suggests that a consideration of ﬁrm-level de-
terminants adds a signiﬁcant new dimension to the FDI literature, that has
traditionally relied only on industry- and country-speciﬁc factors to explain
FDI patterns.
The selection of diﬀerent ﬁrms within an industry into diﬀerent invest-
ment and ownership modes should also be taken into account when analyzing
the eﬀects of FDI, for instance, on local ﬁrms, market structure and social
welfare (see, for instance, Aitken and Harrison (1999)). For example, there
is widespread public concern that cross-border M&As may be less beneﬁ-
cial than greenﬁeld FDI or may even have negative eﬀects on host-country
welfare. M&As are often seen simply as a transfer of ownership, whereas
greenﬁeld FDI is perceived as adding to the capital stock of the host country
and creating jobs. More importantly, M&As are seen as reducing competi-
tion in the host market (UNCTAD, 2000, p. 14, 15). A complete analysis
of these issues is beyond the current paper. But clearly, any analysis must
have as its basis a theory (with a solid empirical foundation) of why ﬁrms
choose one strategy rather than the other. Our paper provides some guid-
ance. In particular, since we see a tendency for the biggest, most productive
ﬁrms to choose greenﬁeld FDI and for less productive ﬁrms to choose M&A,
competition in the host country may be higher under greenﬁeld FDI than
under M&A. Notice that this eﬀect goes beyond simply the market struc-
ture eﬀect of having one more ﬁrm in the case of greenﬁeld FDI. Rather, a
more productive multinational in the case of greenﬁeld FDI provides tougher
competition for its local rivals. This has to be good for consumers, because
the increase in competition leads to a lower equilibrium price. However, from
this increase in consumer surplus we would have to subtract the proﬁt that
the multinational earns and potentially repatriates. In addition, the tougher
competition under greenﬁeld FDI means that local ﬁrms would lose market
share, whereas they may gain market share under M&A. FDI in the form




Here we prove that the indiﬀerence curve between greenﬁeld FDI and M&A
must lie everywhere on or below a line with a slope of −1. If we increase α1
and reduce α2 by the same amount, i.e., dα1 = −dα2, the right-hand side of




2(n − 1)A + 2(n2 + 1)α1 − 4nα2
2(n − 1)A + 2(n2 + 1)α2 − 4nα1
. (16)
Note that if α1 = α2, then
dα2
dα1 = −1. If α1 > α2, then the numerator of








¯ > 1. Hence starting at α1 = α2 and increasing α1
by increments dα1 means that α2 has to fall by more than dα1 to keep the
left-hand side of (9) constant. As one continues to raise α1, the denominator
of (16) may become negative; this implies that the line representing the
combinations of α1 and α2 for which the left-hand side of (9) stays constant
ﬁrst becomes vertical and then bends backward so that both α1 and α2 have
to fall to keep the left-hand side of (9) the same. The indiﬀerence curve
between greenﬁeld investment and M&A must have a slope that lies between
−1 (the value that keeps the right-hand side of (9) unchanged) and (16).
7.2 Data
The FDI data employed in this study is compiled from several issues of Toyo
Keizai Inc.’s Kaigai Shinshutsu Kigyo Soran. This data set provides the date
and location of initial investment into (or acquisition of) the foreign aﬃliate.
We focus on those investments for which (1) the aﬃliate was in an industry
for which no local ownership requirements existed at that time (UNCTC),
(2) the principal Japanese investor held an equity ownership share of at least
10%, (3) all of the relevant ownership characteristics are known (as described
26below), and (4) the investment occurred during the period between 1985 and
2000 in one of the sample countries.
For a consistent and detailed determination of the foreign aﬃliate’s in-
dustry aﬃliation, we collected the ﬁrm’s primary 4-digit SIC code for the
year of initial investment (acquisition). Aﬃliate main business line informa-
tion was located in numerous publicly available European sources, as well
as from the main oﬃces of most national foreign investment agencies (e.g.,
STATEC [Luxembourg], Invest in France Agency, Invest in Sweden Agency)
for those aﬃliates too small in size to gain entry into the published corporate
listings. Main business lines reported in earlier SIC revisions (1972, 1977) or
in the European NACE format were converted to the 1987 SIC equivalent by
standard classiﬁcation concordances.
A wholly-owned subsidiary (WOS) is deﬁned as an aﬃliate of a single
Japanese investor not established via M&A (with the parent company holding
at least a 95% equity share in the aﬃliate). A joint venture (JV) is an aﬃliate
not created through M&A, in which none of the investors holds greater than
a 95% equity stake (lowering this to a 90% threshold does not aﬀect our
results). Finally, an M&A investment occurs when the foreign aﬃliate is
established via merger or acquisition. For the purposes of this paper, any
investment through a merger/acquisition is considered an M&A, regardless
of the number of investing parents (however, 88% of the M&As in the sample
were established by a single Japanese parent).
7.2.1 Parent-Speciﬁc Characteristics
For each investment, the Japanese ﬁrm with the largest equity ownership
share is considered the primary investor. Parent 4-digit SIC codes were lo-
cated in Dun and Bradstreet’s Principal International Businesses, National
Register’s Directory of Corporate Aﬃliations, and other publicly available
sources. Various issues of Toyo Keizai’s Japan Company Handbook as well as
the Paciﬁc-Basin Capital Markets Database (PACAP) (2003) provided the
information on the ﬁrm’s age (FirmAge) as well as its annual global export
sales as a percentage of total sales (Export%), total assets (Size), total sales
(Sales), R&D intensity (R&D, measured as R&D expenditure as a percentage
27of total sales), and the ﬁrm’s annual market capitalization (MktCap), deter-
mined by the number of shares of common stock multiplied by the year-end
stock price. Size, Sales, and MktCap are measured in millions of Yen. Also,
Dodwell Marketing’s Industrial Groupings in Japan was used to determine
the investing ﬁrm’s keiretsu membership (KrtsuMem) status.
The Japan Company Handbook and PACAP database also were used to
determine a ﬁrm’s “Approximate Total Factor Productivity” (ATFP), cal-
culated as ATFP = ln(Q)/L−sln(K)/L, where Q,L and K denote output,
employment and capital, respectively, with s = 1/3. This follows Grilliches
and Mairesse (1990) and Head and Ries (2003).
A concern in regard to calculating ATFP—or any total factor produc-
tivity measure for that matter—is the simultaneity bias associated with its
computation. This bias arises, because the ﬁrm can observe its output and
change its factor input mix, yielding biased OLS estimates of the produc-
tion function and, therefore, biased productivity estimates. To correct for
this, we also estimate a ﬁrm’s total factor productivity via Levinsohn and
Petrin’s (2003) estimation technique and the accompanying STATA program.
While highly correlated with the ATFP measure (as noted in Table 2), the
Levinsohn-Petrin TFP (TFP) measure is the more consistent of the two.
7.2.2 Country-Speciﬁc Characteristics
The countries included in this sample are Australia, Belgium, Canada, Den-
mark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy,
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Swe-
den, Switzerland, and the UK. Data for host-market GDP, EconPotential,
and market capitalization (HostCap) were found in the World Bank’s World
Development Indicators CD-ROM, and are measured in billions of U.S. dol-
lars. Data used to construct TaxRate are courtesy of the University of Michi-
gan’s Oﬃce of Tax Policy Research, while exchange rates are determined
from the IMF’s International Financial Statistics CD-ROM.
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